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Abstract	2	
Officiating	and	the	role	of	officials	in	sport	is	are	crucial	and	often	decisive	factors	in	sports	3	
contests.		Notable	contributions	in	philosophy	of	sport	include	Collins	(2012),	Russell	(1997;	4	
1999),	McFee	(2011)	&	Mumford	(2006)	have	brought	a	sharp	philosophical	focus	to	highlight	5	
that	justice	and	desert	of	sport	contests,	in	part,	rely	on	officiating	truths	(performances)	that	6	
arise	 from	an	 appropriate	 admixture	 of	 epistemic	 (judgments)	 and	metaphysical	 (actions)	7	
ingredients.		This	paper	provides	a	rigorous	and	original	philosophical	analysis	of	the	problems	8	
of	obeying	the	rules	and	of	applying	the	rules	of	sport.	 	The	paper	focuses	on	a	particular	9	
phase	of	play	in	rugby	union,	namely	the	scrum.	It	is	fair	to	say	that	the	scrum	has	become	a	10	
focus	of	criticism	and	bewilderment.	Elite	televised	rugby	is	damaged	as	a	spectacle	because	11	
too	much	time	is	wasted	setting	and	re-setting	scrums.	Furthermore,	our	trust	in	the	fairness	12	
of	games	is	eroded	because	the	scrum	is	a	‘lottery’	when	it	comes	to	officiating.	In	this	paper,	13	
we	identify	two	fundamental	structural	problems	which	contribute	to	the	scrum	controversy.	14	
First,	 drawing	on	Mumford	 (2006)	 and	Collins	 (2012)	we	argue	 that	officials	 cannot	make	15	
reliable	judgments	about	scrums	because	they	cannot	see	what	they	need	to	see.	Secondly,	16	
we	argue	that	players	cannot	follow	the	laws	of	the	scrum	even	if	they	have	a	strong	desire	17	
to	 do	 so.	 Laws	 which	 can’t	 be	 followed	 are,	 according	 to	 Fuller	 (2000)	 defective.	18	
Consequently,	 the	scrum	 is	not	only	potentially	dangerous,	but	also	 flawed	 in	 terms	of	 its	19	
capacity	to	actualize	an	intended	part	of	the	game1.					20	
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Introduction	23	
On	 15th	March	 2005,	 a	 promising	 young	 rugby	 union	 prop	 forward	was	 training	with	 the	24	
England	under	21	squad.	During	the	session,	the	young	prop,	Matt	Hampson,	suffered	a	life-25	
threatening	and	 life-changing	 injury	because	of	a	collapsed	scrum.	He	dislocated	his	neck,	26	
severed	his	spinal	cord,	and	became	a	C4/5	tetraplegic2.	Hampson	is	not	the	first	and	will	not	27	
be	the	last	to	sustain	terrible,	but	thankfully	rare,	injuries	from	a	rugby	scrum.	Medics,	sport	28	
scientists,	 referees	and	governing	bodies	have	been	working	hard	over	 the	years	 to	make	29	
rugby	 union	 in	 general,	 and	 scrummaging	 in	 particular,	 safer.	 Changes	 include	 law	30	
modifications	 and	 improved	 conditioning	 of	 those	 occupying	 the	 specialist	 front-row	31	
positions3.	Front-row	players	are	also	much	taller	than	ever	before.	Some,	however,	believe	32	
that	the	scrummaging	ability	of	players	has	diminished	despite,	or	perhaps	because,	of	these	33	
changes	and	made	things	worse.	Consequently,	the	scrum	and	its	continued	place	in	the	game	34	
of	rugby	union	remains	controversial.	Is	it	safe?	Does	it	(or	its	failure)	detract	from	the	flow	35	
and	appeal	of	the	game?	Is	it	an	essential	part	of	the	game?	Our	aim	in	this	paper	is	to	examine	36	
the	rugby	union	scrum	from	an	ethical-legal	perspective	in	order	to	evaluate	whether	the	rules	37	
3	
	
(henceforth	laws)	are	morally	justifiable.4.	We	bring	together	Mumford’s	(2006)	insights	into	1	
‘truth	makers’	 in	sport	together	with	Collin’s	 (2012)	analysis	of	both	the	metaphysical	and	2	
epistemological	 core	 of	 officiating	 and	 argue	 that	 the	 laws	 that	 govern	 the	 scrum	 are	3	
impossible	to	apply	by	referees	in	a	consistently	valid	and	reliable	way.	This	is	the	first	original	4	
conclusion	of	the	paper.	Furthermore,	we	argue	that	some	laws	are	impossible	for	players	to	5	
follow	in	a	consistently	voluntary	way.	Using	Fuller’s	(2000)	philosophy	of	 law,	we	present	6	
another	significant	and	original	conclusion	–	namely	that	the	scrum	laws	(and	other	laws	in	7	
sport	 that	 demand	 the	 impossible)	 are	 flawed.	 	We	 will	 return	 to	Matt	 Hampson’s	 case	8	
towards	the	end	of	the	paper	to	draw	out	some	of	the	implications	of	our	analysis.		9	
Rugby	Union	10	
Rugby’s	origins	lie	in	the	British	public	school	at	Rugby5.	Rugby	football’s	(as	opposed	to	other	11	
types	of	football)	laws	permitted	the	ball	to	be	carried	and	passed	as	well	as	kicked.	Today	12	
the	 game	 has	 all	 the	 trappings	 of	 other	 commercialised	 professional	 sports	 including	13	
governing	bodies,	a	World	Cup,	professional	leagues,	sponsorship	and	specialised	training	and	14	
coaching	structures.	Rugby	has	a	law	book	which	sets	out	the	permitted	means	of	achieving	15	
the	goal	of	winning.	The	laws	also	stipulate	the	non-permissible	means	and	the	penalties	and	16	
sanctions	for	violating	such	prohibitions.	As	with	other	sports,	the	laws	provide	a	framework	17	
that	allows	scope	for	personal	and	collective	‘athletic	performance’.	According	to	Jones	and	18	
Howe	 (2005:	 139),	 “athletic	 performance	 is	 a	 delicate	 mix	 of	 natural,	 moral,	 technical,	19	
aesthetic,	psychological	and	physical	capacities”	and	 involves	“a	collection	of	contextually-20	
grounded	intentional	and	unintentional	actions	or	excellences	that	we	praise	and	celebrate”.	21	
Athletic	performance	is	underdetermined	by	the	laws	of	rugby	(and	in	all	games	other	than	22	
the	simplest)	and	may	involve	non-meritocratic	elements.	Poor	officiating	can	be	the	most	23	
decisive	 non-meritocratic	 influence	 on	 games.	 One	 notable	 example	 of	 injustice	 in	 rugby	24	
comes	to	mind	(at	least	for	Welshmen),	namely,	the	game	between	Wales	and	New	Zealand	25	
(known	as	the	All	Blacks	because	of	their	uniforms)	which	took	place	at	Cardiff	Arms	Park	in	26	
1978.6	Wales	lost	the	game	by	one	point	after	the	All	Blacks	kicked	a	penalty	goal	in	the	last	27	
few	minutes.	The	referee	awarded	a	penalty	kick	because	of	a	lineout	offence	by	Wales.	The	28	
referee	 believed	Welsh	 players	 had	 pushed	 their	 opponents	 out	 of	 the	 line	 intentionally	29	
(infringement).	The	television	images,	however,	clearly	showed	that	two	New	Zealand	players	30	
deliberately	 jumped	 out	 of	 the	 line	 as	 a	 premeditated	 tactic	 to	 deceive	 the	 referee.	 The	31	
decisive	‘act’	was	not	an	athletic	performance	and	the	All	Blacks	ought	not	to	have	gained	an	32	
advantage	from	it.	Conversely,	Wales	did	not	infringe	and	therefore	ought	not	to	have	been	33	
penalised.	Nevertheless,	the	record	books	show	that	Wales	lost.		34	
Many	sports,	and	rugby	is	a	paradigmatic	example,	are	prone	to	officiating	errors	in	general	35	
and	decisive	errors	 in	particular7.	Most	sports	seek	to	eliminate	such	errors	whenever	and	36	
wherever	possible.	In	the	past	few	decades,	rugby	union	has	employed	numerous	measures	37	
to	reduce	the	errors	made.	Two	classes	of	error	routinely	occur.	Type	1	errors	occur	when	a	38	
particular	state	of	affairs	is	not	‘called’	by	the	official	when	it	should	be	(fails	to	penalise	an	39	
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offence	by	team	A).	Type	2	errors	occur	when	an	official	‘calls’	incorrectly	(penalise	team	A	1	
when	no	offence	occurred).	What	is	the	source	of	such	errors?		2	
Mumford	(2006)	provides	a	crucial	analysis	of	judgment	calls	in	sport.	Despite	the	perspicacity	3	
of	Mumford’s	(2006)	analysis,	this	paper	is	the	first	to	apply	his	ideas	to	a	tangible	problem	in	4	
sport.	 Mumford	 (2006)	 identifies	 a	 tripartite	 model	 of	 judgment	 calls.	 He	 distinguishes	5	
between	the	metaphysical,	the	epistemic	and	the	performative	aspects	of	referee	judgments.	6	
The	metaphysical	element	refers	to	‘mind	independent	facts’	in	the	world,	for	example,	the	7	
body	positions	of	players	relative	to	each	other,	to	the	ball	and	to	the	field.	The	‘truth	maker’	8	
for	 judgments	 are	 the	 state	 of	 affairs	 in	 the	 world.	 The	 epistemic	 aspect	 refers	 to	 the	9	
judgment	process.	Mumford	(2006)	argues	that	 it	 is	 the	referee’s	 job	to	make	a	 judgment	10	
based	on	facts	in	relation	to	the	laws	of	the	game.	The	referee	adjudges	a	high	tackle	when	11	
player	A	tackles	player	B	above	the	shoulders.	The	referee	got	it	wrong	if	evidence	emerges	12	
that	 the	 tackle	was	 not	 in	 fact	 above	 the	 shoulders.	 The	 final	 aspect	 is	 the	 performative	13	
element	 whereby	 the	 referee	 makes	 the	 call	 by	 blowing	 a	 whistle	 and	 raising	 an	 arm8.	14	
Historically,	once	the	official	called,	there	was	no	right	to	appeal9.	The	official’s	word	was	final.	15	
Collins	(2010)	provides	additional	and	 important	philosophical	 insight	for	our	analysis	with	16	
the	concept	of	‘ontological	authority’.	The	referee’s	ontological	authority	is	enshrined	in	the	17	
laws	of	rugby.	According	to	Law	6.A.4	(a),	“The	referee	is	the	sole	judge	of	fact	and	Law	during	18	
a	match”	(World	Rugby	2017:	49).	The	outcome	of	a	match	cannot	be	changed	regardless	of	19	
subsequent	 evidence.	 Collins	 (2010:	 136)	 argues	 that	 ontological	 authority	 is	 granted	 to	20	
officials	because	they	have	“the	‘epistemological	privilege’	in	respect	of	everyone	else”	–	in	21	
other	words	they	are	the	most	likely	to	be	able	to	“call	it	as	it	is”.	This	epistemological	privilege	22	
has	(or	traditionally	had)	two	sources.	First,	the	officials	have	a	‘superior	view’	–	they	are	the	23	
closest	independent	and	impartial	persons	to	the	action.	Officials	are	usually	in	a	better	place	24	
to	see	the	relevant	metaphysical	state	of	affairs	in	the	world.	Secondly,	they	have	‘specialist	25	
skills’	 and	 knowledge	 –	 they	 know	 the	 laws	 and	 have	 been	 trained	 to	 apply	 them	 in	26	
accordance	with	the	best	traditions	of	the	practice.		27	
The	referee	no	longer	has	the	superior	view	tout	court.	TV	viewers	can	see	his	mistakes	and	28	
his	 authority	 is	 undermined10.	Many	 sports	 have	 sought	 to	 re-establish	 authority	 both	 by	29	
helping	referees	‘see’	and	by	improving	their	‘specialist	skills’.	At	the	elite	level	of	rugby	union,	30	
there	are	four	officials	responsible	for	adjudicating	each	game.	A	referee	follows	play	on	the	31	
field	and	is	ultimately	responsible	for	calling	the	game.	Two	assistant	referees	on	either	side	32	
of	the	field	are	responsible	for	specific	elements	 like	denoting	whether	or	not	the	ball	has	33	
crossed	 the	 touchline	 and	 provide	 additional	 ‘eyes’11.	 There	 is	 also	 a	 fourth	 official	 or	34	
television	match	official	(TMO)	who	watches	the	game	on	a	television	screen	and	has	access	35	
to	replays	and	various	camera	angles.	If	the	referee	on	the	field	is	unsure	of	certain	decisions,	36	
usually	to	do	with	scoring	or	foul	play,	he	has	the	right	to	ask	for	help	from	the	TMO.	Each	37	
official	must	meet	standards	of	proficiency	across	a	variety	of	relevant	outcomes	including	38	
fitness,	 knowledge	 of	 the	 game,	 decision-making	 and	 communication.	 Despite	 these	39	
improvements	some	‘calls’	will	continue	to	be	controversial.	Peters	(1981:	37)	argues	“that	40	
5	
	
rules	do	not	dictate	their	own	application”.	We	cannot	avoid	the	epistemic	element	of	calls	1	
in	sport	and	the	official	invested	with	ontological	authority	must	judge	even	when	there	is	no	2	
dispute	about	what	 is	seen.	Rugby	 is	not	unique	in	this	regard,	but	the	scrum	exacerbates	3	
such	complexities	and	make	disputes	inevitable.		4	
The	Scrum		5	
The	scrum	in	rugby	union	has	been	a	pivotal	and	fabled	part	of	the	game.	It	is	a	means	of	re-6	
starting	 play	 following	 a	minor	 infringement	 by	one	 side	or	 other.	 Eight	 specialist	 players	7	
(forwards	–	collectively	known	as	the	pack)	from	each	side	bind	with	each	other	roughly	in	a	8	
3-4-1	 formation	 and	 then	bind	with	 the	opposition	 forwards	 (similarly	 formed)	 creating	 a	9	
‘scrum’.	The	two	packs	come	together	forming	a	‘tunnel’	over	a	‘mark’	–	the	precise	location	10	
where	the	infringement	took	place.	The	scrum	should	remain	stable	over	the	‘mark’	and	must	11	
be	‘square’	(parallel	to	the	touchline).	The	attacking	team	then	feeds	the	ball	‘straight’	into	12	
the	tunnel.	This	action	triggers	a	‘contest’	between	the	two	packs	who	aim	to	win	the	ball	by	13	
striking	with	their	feet	and/or	pushing	their	opponents	backwards.	This	requires	 individual	14	
and	collective	strength,	technique	and	determination.	Quick	ball	from	the	scrum	provides	a	15	
team	an	excellent	platform	to	attack,	but	also	provides	an	opportunity	for	one	team’s	pack	to	16	
physically	 and	 psychologically	 dominate	 their	 opponents.	 In	 recent	 years,	 the	 scrum	 has	17	
become	problematic	because	many	 fail	–	most	often,	 they	collapse	as	 the	 front	 rows	 fold	18	
downwards	(the	cause	of	the	injury	above).	The	cumulative	time	taken	for	scrums	during	any	19	
given	 rugby	 game	 detracts	 from	 the	 spectators’	 enjoyment	 and	 frustrates	 players	 and	20	
coaches.	According	 to	World	Rugby,	 the	average	 time	 taken	per	 scrum	 is	60	 seconds,	 the	21	
average	number	of	scrums	per	international	test	match	is	8-10.	Consequently,	over	10%	of	22	
the	game	 is	 ‘wasted’	on	scrums.	There	 is	also	a	perception	that	scrums	are	a	 ‘lottery’	and	23	
especially	prone	to	officiating	errors.	The	scrum	laws	are	complex,	but	here	is	one	example.		24	
Law	20.3	(c)	25	
Binding	by	loose	head	props:	A	loose	head	prop	must	bind	on	the	opposing	tight	head	26	
prop	by	placing	the	left	arm	inside	the	right	arm	of	the	tight	head	and	gripping	the	27	
tight	head	prop’s	jersey	on	the	back	or	side.	The	loose	head	prop	must	not	grip	the	28	
chest,	arm,	sleeve	or	collar	of	the	opposition	tight	head	prop.	The	loose	head	prop	29	
must	not	exert	any	(our	emphasis)	downward	pressure.	(World	Rugby	2017:	143)	30	
The	source	of	the	problem	–	referees	31	
Seeing	32	
If	 the	scrum	collapses,	we	assume	that	 there	are	mind	 independent	 facts	 that	explain	 the	33	
collapse.	Although	it	is	clear	when	a	scrum	has	collapsed,	it	is	not	always	clear	why	a	scrum	34	
collapsed	and	less	clear	who	was	responsible	for	the	collapse.	The	why	and	who	are	both	vital	35	
if	the	referee	is	to	make	the	right	call.	It	is	not	easy	to	help	the	referee	see	the	why	and	who.	36	
We	cannot	see	the	forces	that	triggered	a	chain	of	causal	events	that	bring	about	a	scrum	37	
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collapse.	 Biomechanists	 have	 sought	 to	 measure	 and	 quantify	 the	 forces	 involved	 in	1	
scrummaging	 (mainly	 for	 safety	 purposes),	 but	 even	 in	 the	 lab,	 there	 is	 currently	 no	2	
technology	 that	could	 identify	 the	decisive	causal	event	 in	a	 live	 scrum	collapse.	We	must	3	
commit	to	the	(metaphysical)	idea	that	there	are	“mind	independent	facts	of	the	matter	in	4	
the	world”	(Mumford	2006:	183),	but	accept	that	the	important	facts	required	to	make	a	call	5	
may	not	be	available.	If	the	referee	cannot	make	a	call	because	he	is	unable	to	judge	the	facts	6	
–	or	see	the	cause	of	the	collapse,	they	must	reset	the	scrum.	This	is	a	welcome	option,	but	7	
referees	must	use	it	sparingly.	In	theory,	a	scrum	sequence	could	go	on	indefinitely	because	8	
there	may	be	a	sequence	of	collapses	where	the	why	and	who	is	not	clear.	Referees	can	use	9	
discretion	to	keep	the	game	flowing.	If	possible,	they	will	play	‘advantage’	–	allowing	the	play	10	
to	unfold	despite	the	collapse	–	urging	the	advantaged	team	to	‘use	it’.	The	imperative	to	use	11	
it	quickly	has	two	sources.	The	first	 is	game	flow	–	to	get	the	game	moving.	Torres	(2012)	12	
argues	that	the	aesthetic	value	of	a	game	is	not	some	supervening	quality,	but	is	definitive	of	13	
that	game.	Referees	must	play	their	part	in	ensuring	that	the	aesthetic	values	as	well	as	the	14	
moral	values	prevail.	A	dominant,	(although	contested)	aesthetic	value	of	rugby	originates	in	15	
the	expansive	passing	and	running	opportunities	the	game	affords.	Long	disruptions	caused	16	
by	scrums	devalue	the	game.	The	second	is	the	safety	of	the	players.	The	scrum	can	be	a	very	17	
dangerous	phase	of	play	and	the	referee	has	a	duty	to	protect	players	from	injury.	The	referee	18	
must	decide	if	it	is	safe	to	allow	the	advantage	to	unfold	or	allow	the	scrum	to	‘breathe’.	If	19	
the	risk	 is	too	great,	he	must	stop	the	play	 immediately.	The	capacity	to	make	a	valid	and	20	
reliable	 ‘harm-prevention’	 call	 is	 similarly	 difficult	 because	 a	 referee	 cannot	 definitively	21	
predict	whether	an	injury	(serious	or	otherwise)	is	likely	to	occur.	He	will	therefore	err	on	the	22	
side	of	caution.	The	advantage	law	provides	an	important,	but	limited,	solution	to	excessive	23	
disruption	of	a	game	by	scrums.	Moreover,	the	advantage	law	favours	the	attacking	team.	24	
This	 is	 prima	 facie	 positive;	 however,	 we	 believe	 that	 it	 threatens	 fairness	 in	 certain	25	
circumstances12.		26	
Knowing	27	
Thus	far,	we	have	concentrated	on	the	seeing	–	the	‘superior	view’	that	partly	grounds	their	28	
authority.	Given	the	difficulties	identified,	their	‘specialist	skills’	become	more	important.		29	
Specialist	skills:	Professional	umpires	are	usually	ex-players,	are	given	special	training,	30	
and	their	decisions	are	continually	scrutinized	by	professional	bodies.	Thus,	umpires	31	
have	 specialist	 skills	 that	 are	 enhanced	 by	 the	 build-up	 of	 scrutinised	 umpiring	32	
experience	(Collins	2010:	136).	33	
Critics	are	perhaps	not	sensitive	to	the	distinction	drawn	by	Collins	between	‘superior	view’	34	
and	‘superior	skill’.	They	believe	that	referees	make	poor	calls	because	they	‘don’t	understand	35	
the	scrum’	or	do	not	have	‘empathy’	for	players.	They	argue	that	because	certain	referees	36	
have	not	played	in	the	scrum	they	do	not	know	what	goes	on.	It	is	not	that	they	do	not	know	37	
the	laws,	but	rather	do	not	know	how	to	apply	the	laws.	The	former	is	a	form	of	propositional	38	
knowledge	–	knowing	that,	whilst	the	latter	is	a	form	of	procedural,	practical,	craft	or	tacit	39	
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knowledge	–	knowing	how.	Know-how	is	evidenced	in	action.	Winch	(2016:	566)	argues	that	1	
assessing	know-how	involves	judging	the	action	or	performance	–	it	cannot	be	discerned	by	2	
a	‘theory’	test.	3	
How	do	we	know	that	a	referee	is	good	at	refereeing	a	scrum?	4	
Mumford	(2006:	183)	argues	that	when	making	a	judgment	call	“the	object	of	the	judgement	5	
is	something	the	existence	of	which	is	independent	of	the	judgment”.	We	have	argued	that	6	
on	occasions	the	metaphysical	state	of	affairs	(the	truth	maker)	is	not	accessible	to	the	good	7	
referee,	the	poor	referee,	the	referee	reviewers	or	anyone	else	for	that	matter.	Good	referees	8	
are	the	ones	that	do	see	a	player	F-ing	(violating	law	20.3	c)	when	it	can	be	seen,	but	good	9	
referees	also	must	make	a	call	when	they	cannot	see	a	player	F-ing13.	Some	argue	that	good	10	
referees	do	not	need	to	see	 in	the	way	we	have	described	above,	but	know	what	goes	on	11	
despite	being	unsighted.	What	kind	of	knowledge	is	this	and	what	‘truth	maker’	is	required	to	12	
validate	resultant	judgments?	13	
One	view	is	that	one	acquires	important	knowledge	through	scrummaging.	In	other	words,	14	
‘one	 knows	 what	 goes	 on	 in	 the	 scrum	 because	 one	 knows	 how	 to	 scrummage’.	 This	15	
explanation	 is	 problematic	 for	 at	 least	 two	 reasons.	 Firstly	 refereeing,	 like	 instructing,	16	
coaching	or	teaching	demands	a	level	of	expertise	about	something	one	cannot	do	oneself.	17	
The	referee	currently	considered	the	best	 in	 the	world,	 like	many	other	 top	referees	 (and	18	
coaches),	did	not	play	in	the	scrum	at	the	elite	level	or	otherwise.14	This	does	not	mean	he	19	
cannot	have	 important	 knowledge	about	 it.	 Secondly,	 referees	do	not	need	 to	be	able	 to	20	
scrummage,	 but	 do	 need	 to	 know	 how	 to	 scrummage	 in	 order	 to	 referee	 the	 scrum	21	
effectively.	Scrummaging	and	refereeing	the	scrum	are	different	tasks	and	involve	different	22	
types	of	know-how.	Knowing	what	happens	in	the	scrum,	knowing	how	the	forces	interact,	23	
knowing	what	tactics	players	use,	knowing	how	stature	and	technique	affect	any	given	scrum	24	
is	what	 a	 referee	 requires	 rather	 than	 the	 ability	 to	 scrummage	excellently.	 The	different	25	
‘know-how’	is	acquired	differently.		26	
Referees’	know-how	is	acquired	through	structured	and	reflective	practice.	Their	ability	and	27	
expertise	develops	over	time.	As	they	gain	experience	officiating	(starting	with	 lower	 level	28	
games),	their	ability	 improves,	they	develop	a	‘feel’	 for	the	game	and	an	understanding	of	29	
how	the	game	‘should’	be	played	both	from	a	lawful	and	aesthetic	perspective.	They	have	a	30	
period	of	‘apprenticeship’	and	progress	when	they	are	competent	to	do	so.	They	are	subject	31	
to	continuous	evaluation	and	training.	Only	the	best	progress	to	officiate	at	the	elite	level.	32	
Good	referees	can	call	on	the	‘spirit’	of	the	law	in	addition	to	the	letter	of	the	law	(see	Russell	33	
1999)	 and	 they	 receive	 clear	directives	 about	how	 to	apply	 the	 laws15.	 The	 referee’s	high	34	
standards	should	be	stable	within	an	acceptable	range	and	calls	will	vary	according	to	the	35	
circumstances.	The	refereeing	apprenticeship	or	development	programme	requires	referees	36	
demonstrate	their	ability	and	continuously	review	and	explain	their	decisions	and	actions	to	37	
a	review	panel	who	evaluate	and	provide	feedback.		38	
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The	truth	maker	for	the	call	–	‘player	A	was	F-ing’	is	the	independent	fact	that	player	A	was	1	
indeed	F-ing.	If	the	truth	maker	for	the	call	is	not	available	or	is	in	doubt,	can	we	still	claim	2	
that	‘Referee	X	was	right	to	make	the	call	that	player	A	was	F-ing’?	If	there	is	no	truth	maker	3	
available	for	the	call,	can	there	be	a	truth	maker	for	the	claim	that	the	call	was	right?	Assessors	4	
and	critics	do	make	judgments	about	referees	in	the	absence	of	the	‘mind	independent	state	5	
of	affairs’	but	how	do	we	know	they	are	right?	The	explanation	lies	in	a	shift	from	a	“factual	6	
explanation”	 to	a	“judgmental	 interpretation”	of	 truth	makers	 (Mumford	2006:	182).	 ‘The	7	
referee	 is	 the	 sole	 judge	 of	 fact	 and	 Law	 during	 a	 match’	 embodies	 the	 ‘judgmental	8	
interpretation’.	Once	the	referee,	having	consulted	all	the	resources	available,	makes	a	call,	9	
that	call	cannot	be	overturned.	The	post-match	review	process,	however,	can	judge	that	the	10	
referee	made	poor	calls	 (although	 the	 result	will	 stand).	The	panel	might	give	 the	 referee	11	
advice	 about	 what	 to	 do	 next	 time	 and/or	 stop	 them	 from	 progressing	 to	 higher	 profile	12	
matches.	The	‘judgmental	interpretation’	of	‘truth	maker’	is	not	wholly	satisfactory,	especially	13	
in	cases	where	there	is	a	decisive	mind	independent	state	of	affairs.		14	
Example	15	
On	18th	March	2017,	a	game	of	rugby	union	between	France	and	Wales	became	a	paradigm	16	
example	of	the	problems	we	are	highlighting	here.	Wales	were	leading	the	game,	18	points	17	
to	13,	with	a	few	minutes	to	go.	France	had	home	advantage	and	could	win	the	game	if	they	18	
got	seven	points16.	Wales	were	penalised	close	to	their	own	goal	 line	 in	the	middle	of	the	19	
field.	France	took	the	strategic	decision	to	opt	for	a	scrum.	A	lengthy	sequence	of	calls	and	20	
plays	followed	including	12	more	scrums.	Each	call	was	potentially	decisive.	In	other	words,	21	
the	match	 result	 rested	on	 the	 referee’s	next	call.	Many	of	 the	decisive	calls	 involved	 the	22	
interpretation	and	application	of	scrum	laws	such	as	20.3	above.	The	ultimate	outcome	was	23	
that	France	won	the	game	after	an	unprecedented	sequence	of	plays17.		24	
Post-match	analysis	and	debate	focused	on	the	process.	If	A	then	B,	if	C	then	D.	In	other	words,	25	
if	there	is	an	offence,	then	penalise	the	offender.	If	there	is	a	repeated	offence,	use	the	sin	26	
bin.	If	there	is	an	injury,	follow	the	Head	Injury	Assessment	protocol.	Our	concern,	however,	27	
is	not	whether	the	referee	Bs	in	response	to	A,	but	rather	whether	A?	There	are	numerous	28	
events	 in	 the	sequence	where	 the	 factual	 ‘truth	maker’	was	not	available	or	 is	 in	dispute.	29	
There	were	13	scrums	in	the	sequence	above	and	none	called	against	France.	On	occasions,	30	
the	referee	re-set	the	scrum	because	there	was	no	obvious	offence.	Subsequent	analysis	of	31	
television	 coverage	 validates	 those	 decisions,	 but	 other	 decisions	 are	 significantly	32	
questionable.	 On	 two	 occasions,	 television	 replays	 are	 suggestive	 of	 France	 offending	 –	33	
binding	offence	–	but	they	are	not	penalised.	The	referee	could	not	be	certain	that	France	34	
‘caused’	the	binding	offence,	but	it	‘looked’	as	if	they	did.	We	argue	that	in	this	sequence	(and	35	
in	other	scrums)	the	referee	penalised	Wales	when	it	looked	like	they	offended,	but	did	not	36	
penalise	France	when	it	looked	like	they	offended.	Were	the	calls	correct?	In	the	absence	of	37	
the	‘factual	truth	maker’,	the	referee	makes	a	call	that	he	believes	he	can	‘justify’	and	will	38	
achieve	 a	 consensus	 among	 the	 reviewers	 (judgmental	 interpretation).	 France	 were	39	
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dominant,	they	were	on	the	attack,	they	had	nothing	to	gain	from	offending,	they	had	home	1	
field	advantage.	Only	a	courageous	referee	would	have	called	against	France,	but	courage	is	2	
an	important	virtue	and	a	courageous	referee	might	have	better	served	justice.	We	are	not	3	
evaluating	 this	 referee’s	 character,	 but	 illustrating	 a	 systematic	 issue	 with	 calling	 in	 the	4	
absence	of,	or	when	the	truth	maker	 is	 in	doubt.	At	certain	times	during	a	game,	calling	a	5	
scrum	can	have	a	decisive	impact	and	it	is	a	heavy	burden	for	a	referee	to	carry18.	When	in	6	
doubt	referees	make	calls	that	are	easy	to	sell.	More	controversially,	referees	make	calls	they	7	
can	sell	even	if	they	have	a	strong	suspicion	that	it	is	not	the	right	call.19	There	was	a	palpable	8	
sense	 when	 watching	 the	 above	 sequence	 unfold	 that	 play	 would	 continue	 until	 France	9	
scored,	or	they	made	an	obvious	error.	Essentially	the	contest	was	over	before	France	scored	10	
the	decisive	points.		11	
The	source	of	the	problem	–	players	12	
The	referee	has	an	unenviable	task.	The	task	is	more	difficult	because	of	the	impact	the	scrum	13	
laws	have	on	players.	 The	 scrum	 is	 a	 contest	within	a	 contest.	 Each	 team	seeks	 to	gain	a	14	
competitive	advantage,	or	at	least	minimise	the	competitive	advantage	of	their	opponents.	15	
The	 scrum	 is	 part	 of	 the	 restorative	 justice	 process20.	 The	 laws	 of	 the	 scrum	 reflect	 this	16	
restorative	 goal	 by	 favouring	 one	 side	 over	 the	 other.	 Coaches	 select	 players	 in	 specific	17	
positions	because	they	have	the	skills	and	stature	that	will	help	translate	structural	advantage	18	
into	competitive	advantage	for	their	team	and	stop	similar	translation	for	their	opponents.	19	
Teams	 want	 a	 dominant	 scrum	 and	 dominant	 players	 mainly,	 but	 not	 exclusively,	 the	20	
specialist	prop	forward	positions	(shirt	numbers	1	and	3).	The	scrum	can	be	lost	(‘against	the	21	
head’)	when	the	team	advantaged	by	the	laws	fail	to	convert	structural	advantage	into	an	22	
actual	advantage.	This	can	happen	fairly	because	of	a	mismatch	in	strength,	power,	technique	23	
or	skill	or	unfairly	because	of	a	poor	call.	Having	a	dominant	scrum	also	means	that	close	calls	24	
are	likely	to	go	in	your	favour	which	in	turn	translate	into	points	on	the	scoreboard.				25	
We	have	argued	above	that	it	can	be	very	difficult	for	referees	to	detect	foul	play	in	the	scrum.	26	
Here	we	argue	that	 it	can	be	impossible	for	players	to	comply	with	the	laws	of	the	scrum,	27	
even	 if	 they	 really	want	 to.	 Some	of	what	happens	 to	players’	bodies	during	 the	 scrum	 is	28	
outside	 their	 control.	External	 forces	 from	the	opposition	and	 from	their	own	players	 can	29	
literally	force	them	into	a	position	against	their	will.	The	sources	that	‘force’	a	player	into	such	30	
positions	may	include:	31	
1. The	combination	of	forces	in	a	legal	scrum		32	
2. The	player	might	slip	because	of	a	poor	playing	surface	33	
3. The	superior	strength	and	technique	of	the	opponent		34	
4. The	result	of	an	unlawful	action	by	opponent	35	
5. Any	combination	of	the	above	36	
The	laws	of	rugby	(and	most	of	the	rules	of	other	sports)	are	strict	liability,	or	absolute	liability	37	
laws.	In	other	words,	the	intention	of	the	offender	or	their	negligence	is	not	a	factor.	Law	20.3	38	
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(c)	above	makes	no	reference	to	a	player’s	intention.	Players	in	rugby	and	other	sports	are	1	
routinely	punished	(and	rightly	so)	for	actions	they	did	not	intend,	for	example,	a	high	or	late	2	
tackle.	In	relation	to	some	laws	it	was	arguably	in	the	offender’s	power	not	to	instigate	the	3	
movement,	which	led	to	the	state	of	affairs	called	as	foul	play	by	the	referee.	In	the	scrum,	4	
however,	such	freedom	is	not	always	available.	Players	might	muster	all	their	effort,	strength	5	
and	skill	to	avoid	folding	or	standing	up,	but	forces	may	conspire	against	them.	They	simply	6	
cannot	avoid	falling	foul	of	the	law.	We	believe	that	in	attempting	to	legislate	the	scrum,	the	7	
legislators	 (World	 Rugby)	 have	 failed	 to	 recognise	 an	 important	 flaw	 in	 their	 laws.	 Fuller	8	
(2000)	provides	valuable	insights	into	the	legislative	process	that	helps	substantiate	our	claim.			9	
According	to	Fuller	(2000:	93),	“…the	attempt	to	create	and	maintain	a	system	of	legal	rules	10	
may	miscarry	in	at	least	eight	ways”;	in	other	words,	there	are	eight	features	that	must	be	11	
avoided21.	The	first	is	not	to	make	any	law	at	all	–	so	that	every	issue	is	decided	on	an	ad-hoc	12	
basis.	Such	a	legal	system	might	be	like	the	‘moral’	particularism	favoured	by	Dancy	(2004),	13	
but	morality	and	the	law	differ	in	important	and	significant	ways.	Moreover,	there	would	be	14	
no	‘sport’	at	all	under	such	a	system	(no	constitutive	rules).	Rules	or	laws	bring	sports	into	15	
existence.	Among	the	eight	listed	by	Fuller,	the	sixth	and	the	eighth	flaw	are	most	relevant	16	
for	our	discussion.	The	sixth	flaw	is	to	create	“rules	that	require	conduct	beyond	the	powers	17	
of	 the	 affected	 party”	 and	 the	 eighth	 is	 “a	 failure	 of	 congruence	 between	 the	 rules	 as	18	
announced	and	their	actual	administration”	(Fuller	2000:	93).	Our	claim	is	that	the	scrum	is	19	
governed	by	laws	that,	on	occasion,	players	simply	cannot	follow.	This	is	an	empirical	claim	20	
about	 forces,	 muscles,	 angles	 and	 not	 a	 claim	 about	 mental	 states	 or	 intentions.	 It	 is	21	
sometimes	impossible	for	individuals	to	withstand	the	forces	and	pressures	generated	by		a	22	
dominant	scrum	created	lawfully	or	unlawfully.	According	to	Fuller	(2000:	93),	there	can	be	23	
no	 rational	 basis	 for	 insisting	 that	 someone	 ought	 to	 obey	 a	 rule	 that	 “commanded	 the	24	
impossible”.	Players,	specialist	coaches	and	even	equipment	manufacturers	work	to	improve	25	
strength,	 grip,	 power	 and	 technique	 to	 try	 to	 meet	 physical	 demands,	 but	 on	 occasions	26	
players	are	powerless	in	the	face	of	the	scrum	forces.	It	is	likely	that	this	has	always	been	the	27	
case	in	scrums,	but	recent	law	changes	have	made	the	situation	worse.	They	do	not	provide	28	
the	opportunity	for	players	to	‘wrestle’	in	order	to	‘find’	a	strong	position	that	will	help	them	29	
exert	and/or	manage	force.	Law	20.1	 (f)	prescribes	“front	 rows	coming	 together”	 (World	Rugby	30	
2017:	141).	The	current	scrum	cadence	orchestrated	by	the	referee	is,	 ‘crouch,	bind,	set’.	This	was	31	
introduced	in	2013	to	replace	the	2012	cadence,	‘crouch,	touch,	pause,	engage’.	These	changes	came	32	
about	as	a	direct	result	of	players	having	been	coached	to	‘hit’	at	the	coming-together	phase	to	gain	33	
the	upper	hand.		Such	an	action	would	often	lead	to	scrum	instability	(and	subsequent	collapse)	and	34	
an	increased	likelihood	of	sustaining	a	neck	injury.	By	introducing	the	2012	cadence,	front	rows	were	35	
brought	 closer	 together,	 reducing	opportunities	 to	charge	at	one’s	opponent	 (an	unlawful	action).	36	
With	the	2013	change,	prop	forwards	were	further	limited	in	their	pre-scrum	‘shenanigans’,	as	they	37	
had	 to	 pre-bind	 to	 their	 opponent.	 Such	 an	 action	 provides	 officials	 with	 an	 increased	 chance	 of	38	
‘seeing’	binding	infringements.		39	
We	have	also	made	the	empirical	claim	that	 it	 is	 impossible	for	referees	to	administer	the	40	
laws	as	announced	(flaw	eight)	because	they	do	not	have	access	to	the	relevant	causal	state	41	
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of	affairs.		Above,	we	discussed	an	example	of	a	scrum	where	the	attacking	team	appeared	to	1	
be	 offending	 (standing	 up).	 It	 would	 have	 been	 reasonable	 to	 draw	 the	 conclusion	 that	2	
because	their	forward	motion	was	being	resisted,	the	laws	of	physics	determined	they	stood	3	
up.	We	claim	that	it	is	reasonable	to	conclude	that	in	this	situation	the	referee	did	not	‘call’	4	
the	standing	offence	because	the	French	team	were	‘dominant’.	.	 It	would	have	been	very	5	
difficult	for	the	referee	to	‘sell’	the	call	given	the	match	circumstances.	The	fact	that	France	6	
were	playing	at	home	in	front	of	a	big	crowd	and	were	behind	might	all	contribute	to	the	7	
decision	making.	Garicano	et	al.	(2005)	found	that	(soccer)	referees	favour	home	teams	by,	8	
among	other	 things,	shortening	games	when	the	home	team	 is	ahead,	 lengthening	games	9	
when	they	are	behind	(the	above	game	lasted	20	minutes	longer	than	normal).	We	are	not	10	
claiming	 that	 the	 referee	 in	 this	 game	 intentionally	 favoured	 either	 team,	 but	 given	 the	11	
complexity	of	the	scrum	we	do	claim	that	there	is	evidence	of	incongruity	between	the	scrum	12	
laws	and	their	administration	in	this	case.												13	
As	a	consequence	of	these	key	flaws	in	scrum	laws,	players	are	in	the	invidious	position	of	14	
knowing	that	they	may	be	penalised	despite	their	best	efforts	to	comply	with	the	laws	and/or	15	
escape	 punishment	when	 they	 have	 deliberately	 violated	 the	 laws.	 They	 are	 to	 a	 certain	16	
extent	at	the	mercy	of	both	the	forces	in	the	scrum	(flaw	six)	and	the	referee’s	potentially	17	
unreliable	 reading	 of	 the	 situation	 (flaw	 eight).	 Consequently,	 the	 scrum	 has	 become	18	
notorious	for	gamesmanship,	rule-bending	or	‘the	dark	arts’.	Moreover,	coaches	analyse	the	19	
performance	of	referees	and	identify	that	referee	A,	when	given	a	choice	between	calling	X	20	
or	Y	is	likely	to	call	Y.	Coaches	even	alter	team	selection	in	the	scrum	based	on	which	referee	21	
is	adjudicating	and/or	make	substitutions	during	games	in	response	to	perceived	nuances	of	22	
the	referee’s	calls22.		23	
The	scrum	and	game	reasoning	24	
Empirical	research	 into	the	morality	of	athletes	 in	general,	and	male	contact	sportsmen	in	25	
particular,	confirm	Morgan’s	(1994)	idea	of	an	ethos	of	radical	instrumentalism	within	sports.	26	
Shields	and	Bredemeier	(1995:	113)	describe	a	“moral	atmosphere	of	sport”	characterised	by	27	
instrumental	rationality	or	in	Kohlberg’s	(1981)	terms	an	‘obedience	and	punishment’	or	‘self-28	
interest’	moral	orientation.	This	‘bracketed	morality’	or	‘game	reasoning’	is	characterised	by	29	
transference	 of	moral	 responsibility	 to	 the	 referee,	 ‘It’s	 only	 illegal	 if	 I	 get	 caught’.	 Such	30	
instrumentalism	may	be	disapproved	of	publically,	but	unlawful	acts	that	go	undetected	are	31	
often	 “admired	 and	 approved	 of”	 by	 spectators	 especially	 if	 successful	 (Reddiford	 1998:	32	
225)23.	Given	the	 inherent	 justice	and	safety	 jeopardy	of	 the	scrum	that	we	have	outlined	33	
above,	players	‘do	what	they	have	to	do’	to	survive	and	dominate.	To	this	end,	scrums	are	a	34	
paradigmatic	example	of	a	non-verbal	 ‘moral	dialogue’	 (Haan:	1983)	 in	sport	whereby	the	35	
terms	of	the	interaction	are	‘thrashed	out’	by	the	players’	physical	acts.	There	is	a	dynamic	of	36	
pressure,	resistance,	force,	counter-force	as	both	packs	seek	to	dominate	each	other	and	get	37	
the	 referee	 onside.	 The	methods	 used	 in	 the	 dialogue	 include	 legal	 techniques,	 but	 also	38	
include	‘bending	the	rules’	and	straightforward	rule-breaking.	Russell	(2017)	coins	the	term	39	
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‘competitive	 shenanigans’	 to	describe	 tolerated	morally	 questionable	behaviours	 in	 sport.	1	
The	 reason	 ‘shenanigans’	 are	 tolerated	 is	 that	 they	 add	 something	 to	 the	 contest.	 They	2	
contribute	to	the	enjoyment,	competitive	intensity	and	tension.	It	is	clear,	at	least	among	a	3	
certain	constituency	(the	front	row	union),	that	certain	strategies	to	‘gain	the	upper	hand’	are	4	
celebrated	and	valued.	Props	with	the	guile,	strength,	toughness	and	brutality	to	dominate	5	
achieve	legendary	status24.	Russell	(2017)	argues	that	when	such	shenanigans	detract	from	6	
the	contest	they	ought	not	to	be	tolerated.	The	game	of	rugby	has	changed	significantly	over	7	
the	years.	In	the	past,	the	shenanigans	produced	quick	strategic	advantage.	Currently,	such	8	
shenanigans	are	more	likely	to	result	in	slow	play,	re-setting	of	scrums	and	penalties.	Each	9	
strategy	 has	 a	 degree	 of	 jeopardy	 attached	 because	 the	 players	 are	 operating	 under	 the	10	
situation	 where	 the	 referee’s	 judgment	 is	 seen	 as	 a	 lottery.	 It	 is	 not	 that	 the	 laws	 are	11	
indeterminate	–	what	should	be	done	if	X	is	clearly	stated.	The	problem	is	whether	referees	12	
can	decide	if	X.		The	referee,	as	Russell	(1999)	argues,	can	be	guided	in	his	decision-making	by	13	
more	than	the	laws.	In	the	case	of	the	scrum,	sometimes	the	referee	simply	cannot	reliably	14	
apportion	blame.	He	can,	and	ought	to	use	his	discretion,	but	the	discretion	should	ultimately	15	
aim	at	“fostering	the	excellences	embodied	in	achieving	the	lusory	goal”	(Russell	1999:	35).	16	
Referees	are	encouraged	and	directed	to	reward	‘positive’	play.	Rugby	has	so	many	aspects,	17	
however,	that	a	team	that	plays	with	flair	and	creativity	in	general,	might	seek	to	compensate	18	
for	a	weak	scrum	by	using	‘shenanigans’.	Referees	already	exercise	significant	discretion	in	19	
the	scrum	–	allowing	‘failed’	scrums	to	continue,	but	they	have	a	duty	of	care	to	the	players	20	
which	means	that	they	must	not	allow	dangerous	situations	to	develop	too	far.	A	referee	who	21	
allowed	a	collapsed	scrum	to	continue	in	order	to	improve	‘flow’	might	be	putting	players	at	22	
risk.	23	
	24	
More	than	a	game		25	
It	will	be	 interesting	to	see	how	governing	bodies	tackle	some	of	the	difficulties	 identified	26	
above.	 The	 scrum	 is	 a	 flawed	 part	 of	 the	 game	 because	 the	 ‘factual	 truth	maker’	 is	 not	27	
available	 for	crucial	and	game-changing	 incidents.	 In	 the	great	scheme	of	 things,	need	we	28	
really	worry	about	poor	calls?	The	example	we	started	the	paper	with	adds	another	dimension	29	
to	the	question.	The	question	about	who	was	responsible	 for	 the	 foul	play	 (and	therefore	30	
giving	the	opponents	a	strategic	advantage)	becomes	who	was	responsible	for	causing	this	31	
life-threatening	and	life-changing	injury.	Following	Hampson’s	injury	there	was	a	tribunal	to	32	
investigate	 the	circumstances	surrounding	the	 injury	and	the	care	he	received	afterwards.	33	
Below	are	extracts	from	the	tribunal	considering	the	circumstances	of	his	injury	which	further	34	
illuminate	the	discussion	above	(extracts	taken	from	Kimmage	2011:	39-40,	73,	181-183).		35	
• Barrister	 questioning	 Cusack,	 Matt	 Hampson’s	 direct	 opponent	 during	 the	 fateful	36	
scrum.	37	
Cusack	38	
13	
	
It	was	their	put-in.	We	were	trying	to	disrupt	them.	1	
Barrister	2	
Is	that	going	in	on	the	angle	to	bore	underneath	his	chest	with	your	head,	Mr	Cusack?	Were	3	
you	trying	to	push	him	up	and	out	of	position?	Was	the	objective	to	try	and	bend	Mr	Hampson	4	
in	two?	5	
Cusack	6	
I	would	never	have	taken	you	for	a	prop,	barrister.	7	
Barrister	8	
It’s	called	the	dark	art	of	scrummaging	I	believe.	9	
Cusack	10	
Some	might	say.	11	
Barrister		12	
And	you	employed	that	art	against	Mr	Hampson?	13	
Cusack		14	
Matt	knew	how	to	take	care	of	himself,	believe	me.		15	
• Barrister	questioning	Tony	Spreadbury,	the	referee	overseeing	the	training	session.		16	
Barrister		17	
Why?	18	
Spreadbury	19	
If	memory	serves	me	correctly,	it	was	for	going	in	on	an	angle	and	taking	the	scrum	down.	20	
Barrister	21	
Isn’t	that	cheating?	22	
Spreadbury	23	
It	was	very	competitive.	They	were	all	 fighting	for	their	places.	They	all	bend	the	rules	and	24	
suffer	from	collective	deafness.	25	
• Barrister	questioning	Matt	Hampson.		26	
Barrister		27	
14	
	
But	have	you	done	it	before?	(Slipped	a	bind)25	1	
Matt	Hampson	2	
Yes,	I	think	all	props	have	tried	it.	3	
Barrister	4	
But	if	there	was	no	point	in	doing	it,	why	did	you	try	it?	5	
Matt	Hampson	6	
I	did	it	because	I	got	away	with	it,	but	I	would	not	get	away	with	it	with	Tony	Spreadbury.	He’s	7	
too	good	a	referee26.	8	
Barrister	9	
But	weren’t	you	penalised	at	least	once	during	the	session	for	failing	to	take	a	correct	bind?	10	
Matt	Hampson		11	
Yes,	I	was.	12	
Barrister	13	
(Smiles)	So	he’s	not	that	good	a	referee?	14	
Matt	Hampson	15	
Well,	like	I	say	to	the	young	lads	at	Oakham	–	you	do	what	you	can	get	away	with.	You	bend	16	
the	rules	to	your	own	advantage.	17	
Barrister	18	
Because	that’s	what	you	were	taught?	19	
Matt	Hampson	20	
Yes,	it	was.	21	
Barrister	22	
To	be	hard	and	ruthless	and	dominant?	23	
Matt	Hampson	24	
Yes.	25	
Barrister	26	
To	never	take	a	backward	step?	27	
15	
	
Matt	Hampson	1	
Never.	2	
Barrister		3	
I	put	it	to	you,	Mr	Hampson,	that	you	were	prepared	to	use	every	trick	in	the	book	to	gain	an	4	
edge	and	were	both	cheating	like	buggery27?	5	
Matt	Hampson	6	
Cheating	is	a	strong	word.	7	
Barrister	8	
What	 word	 would	 you	 use,	 Mr	 Hampson?	 Be	 honest	 now.	 Tell	 the	 tribunal	 your	 exact	9	
thoughts	as	you	looked	Mr	Cusack	in	the	eye	(Mr	Cusack	was	the	opposing	prop	in	the	fateful	10	
scrum).		11	
Matt	Hampson	12	
My	exact	thoughts?	That’s	easy,	Mr	Barrister.	They	were	the	same	for	every	opponent	for	13	
every	scrum.	I	would	have	looked	at	Michael	Cusack	and	thought:	I’m	going	to	drive	your	head	14	
through	your	fucking	arse.		15	
Hampson’s	story	 is	a	fascinating	and	disturbing	read.	The	transcripts	from	the	tribunal	are	16	
particularly	interesting	and	revealing.	The	barrister	was	(in	this	section	and	others)	trying	to	17	
find	out	why	the	scrum	collapsed.	The	barrister	was	looking	to	see	if	the	‘factual	truth	maker’	18	
could	 be	 established	 using	methods	 unavailable	 to	 referees	 (testimony	 under	 oath).	 The	19	
barrister	is	asking	whether	someone’s	actions	led	directly	to	the	collapse	of	the	scrum,	could	20	
we	consider	 these	actions	an	offence,	and	can	we	 identify	an	offender?	There	 is	 far	more	21	
resting	on	the	answers	to	these	questions	than	the	result	of	a	game.	We	do	not	have	the	22	
methods	to	investigate	each	scrum	forensically,	but	it	is	clear	that	there	is	a	‘truth	maker’.	23	
Although	there	have	been	changes	to	mitigate	risk,	the	scrum	remains	a	phase	of	play	that	is	24	
controversial.	The	laws	are	difficult/impossible	to	follow	and	the	consequence	of	a	collapse	25	
can	be	extremely	serious.	Moreover,	because	the	‘shenanigans’	or	‘cheating’	of	players	which	26	
increase	the	risk	is	difficult	to	detect,	this	serves	to	increase	the	risks	further.		27	
	28	
Some	possible	changes	29	
Here	are	four	ways	in	which	the	situation	could	be	improved.	One	change	that	is	in	its	infancy	30	
is	the	re-setting	of	the	scrum	(with	the	same	team	throwing	in)	after	the	scrum	has	wheeled	31	
more	than	90	degrees.	Consequently,	teams	are	now	focussing	on	pushing	their	opponents	32	
off	the	ball	as	opposed	to	simply	wheeling	the	scrum	to	gain	a	turnover	(their	throw-in	at	a	33	
16	
	
new	scrum).	Another	way	that	World	Rugby	could	improve	matters	is	to	simply	emphasise	1	
the	existent	Law	20.1	(f),	as	mentioned	above.	This	would	see	front	rows	coming	together	or	2	
‘folding	in’	in	a	controlled	manner.	There	would	be	little	or	no	opportunity	to	generate	a	‘hit’	3	
and	 the	 increased	 upper-body	 stability	 would	 enhance	 lower-body	 stability,	 as	 front-row	4	
players’	feet	would	be	in	a	strong	position	to	push	(i.e.,	under	their	torso).	Arguably,	teams	5	
use	the	scrum	as	a	means	to	winning	penalties.	Given	that	“the	purpose	of	the	scrum	is	to	6	
restart	play	quickly,	safely	and	fairly,	after	a	minor	infringement	or	a	stoppage”	(World	Rugby	7	
2017:	140),	a	reduction	in	sanction	for	scrum	infringements	could	be	introduced.	That	is,	all	8	
scrum	infringements,	voluntary	or	otherwise,	could	be	free-kick	offences	only.	Team	would	9	
then	be	unable	to	kick	for	goal	following	a	scrum	offence	by	their	opponents.	The	fourth	and	10	
final	proposal	centres	on	the	‘aesthetic’.	The	referee	could	be	‘allowed’	to	reward	the	team	11	
who	was	going	forward	prior	to	any	offence	(major	or	minor)	occurring.	Such	an	approach	12	
might	lead	teams	to	focus	less	on	‘shenanigans’	and	more	on	positive	behaviour.	13	
	14	
Conclusion		15	
Our	aim	in	this	paper	was	to	argue	that	the	scrum	in	rugby	union	is	a	facet	of	the	game	that	16	
causes	significant	and	intractable	problems.	To	officiate	the	scrum	correctly,	referees	need	17	
information	 they	 cannot	 access.	 The	 factual	 ‘truth	 maker’	 is	 unavailable	 to	 them.	18	
Consequently,	they	must	do	the	best	they	can	and	seek	to	make	decisions	that	will	gain	the	19	
approval	of	the	relevant	bodies	(referee	assessors).	A	judgmental	interpretation	truth	maker	20	
comes	into	play.	Good	decisions	are	decisions	that	can	be	justified	or	‘sold’	in	the	absence	of	21	
a	factual	truth	maker.	Aesthetic	considerations	can	sometimes	trump	fairness	considerations.	22	
This	is	justifiable	in	some	cases,	but	not	others.	Safety	concerns	also	exacerbate	the	difficulty	23	
with	officiating	the	scrum.	The	scrum	is	dangerous	and	the	referee	has	a	duty	of	care.	Enacting	24	
this	duty	can	sometimes	be	difficult	for	the	same	reasons	above	–	the	referee	cannot	see.	25	
Justice	and	care	judgments	must	be	balanced	against	the	aesthetic	considerations.	This	is	a	26	
heavy	burden	to	carry.	Players	exacerbate	the	problem.	The	scrum	demands	the	impossible	27	
and	often	punishes	the	innocent.	Players	therefore	do	what	they	can	under	such	constraints	28	
and	engage	 in	a	 ‘moral	dialogue’	with	each	other	 that	 involves	 ‘competitive	shenanigans’,	29	
bending	the	rules,	cheating	and	the	use	of	other	means	to	get	the	referee	‘onside’.	Rugby	is	30	
‘just	a	game’	and	nothing	important	beyond	the	game	rests	on	‘game	rules’.	On	the	contrary,	31	
individuals	 may	 suffer	 serious	 ‘game-transcending’	 injuries	 if	 games	 are	 not	 properly	32	
officiated	and	referees	and	other	players	may	find	themselves	culpable	for	such	injuries28.		33	
	34	
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1	We	are	grateful	to	the	editor	and	two	anonymous	reviewers	for	their	helpful	comments	and	feedback.			
2	The	human	spinal	column	consists	of	33	vertebrae	(bones).	There	are	seven	cervical	vertebrae	(neck	bones)	
C1-C7.	C1	is	the	bone	at	the	base	of	the	skull.	Injuries	in	the	neck	region	are	the	most	serious.	Hampson’s	
spinal	cord	was	severed	at	C4/C5	and	he	has	no	use	of	his	legs	(tetraplegic-	quadriplegic	=	loss	of	use	of	all	4	
limbs)	and	cannot	breathe	without	a	ventilator.			
3	Law	changes	include	2008	–	pre-gripping	in	the	lineout;	2011	–	dangerous/high	tackles;	2012	–	scrum	
cadence:	crouch,	touch,	pause,	engage;	2013	–	crouch,	bind,	set;	2016	–	clearer/stricter	sanctions	for	
dangerous/high	tackles.		
4	Rugby	union	has	laws	rather	than	rules.	
5	Rugby	is	a	market	town	in	the	county	of	Warwickshire	in	England	and	it	is	the	home	of	Rugby	School	and	
thought	to	have	been	the	birthplace	of	rugby	football.		
6	Wales	have	only	beaten	New	Zealand	three	times	in	33	games,	most	recently	in	1953	and	the	Wales	side	of	
1978	is	one	of	the	best	Wales’	sides	ever	and	perhaps	one	of	the	best	rugby	sides	ever.			
7	Perhaps	the	most	infamous	example	of	a	refereeing	error	(for	soccer	fans),	or	at	least	a	failure	on	the	part	of	
the	referee	to	adjudicate	validly,	occurred	in	a	World	Cup	game	in	1986	between	England	and	Argentina.		
Diego	Maradona,	considered	one	of	the	greatest	ever	players,	used	his	hand	to	score	a	goal.	The	referee	
mistakenly	awarded	the	goal.		
8	In	rugby,	the	referee	uses	a	range	of	hand	signals	to	indicate	to	players	and	spectators	what	decision	they	
have	made.	The	signal	for	a	high	tackle	is	a	raised	arm	to	indicate	which	team	committed	the	offence	and	the	
other	arm	across	the	neck.			
9	This	was	partly	because	there	was	no	reliable	and	convenient	means	to	judge	the	validity	of	the	call.		
10	American	golfer	Lexi	Thompson	was	penalised	after	a	TV	viewer	e-mailed	officials	to	inform	them	of	
Thompson’s	foul	play.	http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/golf/39476590	accessed	5/04/2017		
11	At	the	elite	level,	assistant	referees	are	fully	qualified	referees	in	their	own	right.	They	are	capable	and	
proficient.	At	grass	roots	level,	the	assistant	referee	is	often	a	non-qualified	volunteer.		
12	Davis	(2007)	challenges	the	view	that	a	‘type’	of	skilful	play	ought	to	triumph.	Strategic	intelligence	is	also	to	
be	celebrated.	His	examples	relate	to	football	(soccer),	but	a	similar	argument	can	be	made	in	relation	to	
rugby.	A	side	who	‘sticks	the	ball	up	their	jumper’	and	plays	a	non-expansive	mauling	game	are	considered	less	
skilful	and	less	aesthetically	valuable	(even	if	very	successful)	than	teams	who	play	a	quick,	expansive,	running	
and	passing	game.	In	rugby,	the	latter	is	considered	more	attractive	and	marketable	than	the	former.		
13	Referees	cannot	allow	the	scrum	to	continue	indefinitely	because	of	safety	and	aesthetic	reasons.	
14	We	are	not	claiming	that	the	experience	of	playing	could	not	help,	but	it	is	not	decisive	in	the	way	critics	
claim.	
15	World	Rugby’s	Designated	Members	of	the	Rugby	Committee	Governing	Bodies	
16	The	only	way	to	gain	seven	points	is	to	score	a	try	(5	points)	and	then	convert	(2	points).	A	converted	try	is	
like	a	touchdown	followed	by	a	field	goal.	In	rugby	however,	the	conversion	must	be	taken	in	line	with	there	
the	try	is	scored.	Converting	a	try	from	the	edge	of	the	field	of	play	is	more	difficult.	In	this	situation,	France	
wanted	to	score	a	try	in	the	centre	of	the	field	to	guarantee	a	successful	conversion.	Another	option	for	France	
was	a	penalty	try.	The	referee	awards	a	penalty	try	if	he	believes	that	an	offence	by	the	defending	team	stops	
a	certain	try.	The	conversion	is	taken	in	the	centre	of	the	field	regardless	of	where	the	offence	took	place.	
France’s	strategy	of	repeatedly	choosing	a	scrum	aimed	at	gaining	a	penalty	try.	If	the	referee	believed	that	
France	would	have	pushed	the	Welsh	pack	over	the	goal	line,	but	Wales	unlawfully	stopped	them	from	doing	
so,	he	would	award	a	penalty	try.	The	French	players	asked	the	referee	to	award	a	penalty	try,	and	the	referee	
explained	why	he	was	not	willing	to	do	so.							
17	For	a	detailed	analysis	see-	http://www.walesonline.co.uk/sport/sport-opinion/wayne-barnes-big-decisions-
right-12763778	(accessed	23/03/2017)	
18	Craig	Joubert	made	a	call	in	the	quarter-final	of	the	2015	Rugby	World	Cup	between	Scotland	and	Australia.	
He	awarded	a	penalty	to	Australia	–	they	kicked	for	goal	and	won	the	game.	He	rightly	resisted	using	the	big	
screen	to	overturn	his	initial	call	of	offside	against	Scotland	(procedurally	correct),	but	the	correct	call	should	
have	been	a	scrum	award	to	Australia	(although	a	forensic	examination	of	TV	coverage	would	have	been	
required	to	get	the	call	right).	Fans	at	the	stadium	could	see	this	and	reacted	aggressively.	Joubert	departed	
from	the	custom	of	shaking	hands	with	players	at	the	end	of	the	match	and	ran	off	the	pitch	–	perhaps	in	fear	
of	the	reaction	of	players	and	fans.	
19	The	second	author	is	a	former	elite-level	rugby	union	official	and	continues	to	officiate	as	a	TMO.	The	issue	
of	‘selling’	a	call	was	often	discussed	in	performance	reviews.	It	is	easy	to	‘sell’	and	award	a	penalty	kick	to	the	
team	moving	forward	in	a	scrum	even	though	it	may	initially	appear	that	the	attacking	loose	head	prop	stands	
																																								 																				
19	
	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
up	before	his	direct	opponent	(the	defending	tight	head	prop).	XXXXX	recalls	awarding	a	penalty	kick	against	
the	attacking	team	only	to	be	‘told’	by	his	performance	reviewer	that,	while	correct	in	Law,	the	defending	
team	should	have	been	punished	in	order	to	avoid	unnecessary	controversy	(the	call	would	‘look’	wrong).	We	
accept	that	during	a	review,	television	pictures	might	reveal	new	information	that,	if	available	at	the	time,	
could	have	resulted	in	a	different	call,	but	this	is	does	not	challenge	the	thesis	here.		
20	We	could	say	so	much	more	about	this,	but	it	would	take	us	too	far	away	from	the	central	issue.	
21	We	are	very	grateful	to	John	Russell	for	his	valuable	input	in	relation	to	this	point	in	particular,	but	also	to	his	
comments	and	suggestions	on	the	argument	more	generally.			
22	Wales	did	not	select	Gethin	Jenkins	(over	100	caps)	for	a	Test	match	when	it	was	announced	that	a	certain	
French	referee	would	be	officiating.	The	coaches	felt	that	the	referee	had	incorrectly	penalised	Jenkins	on	
numerous	occasions	in	a	recent	club	game	and	took	precautionary	steps	to	avoid	a	repeat.		
23	One	infamous	example	of	this	type	of	behaviour	featured	a	player	called	Neil	Back.	In	2002	at	the	end	of	the	
European	Cup	Final,	Back	deliberately	committed	a	foul	which	would	more	or	less	guarantee	victory	to	his	
team	if	he	got	away	with	it.	He	did	get	away	with	it,	and	his	team	won.	It	was	clear,	however,	to	all	TV	viewers	
that	he	had	offended.	He	was	loath	to	accept	the	label	of	cheat,	instead	describing	his	actions	as	a	form	of	
gamesmanship.		
24	Wales	tight	head	prop	Adam	Jones	was	considered	one	of	the	best	in	the	World	in	his	position.	He	could	
dominate	his	opponents	and	they	were	often	penalised.	A	recent	change	in	the	engagement	sequence	meant	
that	Jones	could	no	longer	dominate.	The	changes	eliminated	Jones’	strategy	of	‘hitting’	and	getting	
immediate	dominance.	http://www.walesonline.co.uk/sport/rugby/rugby-news/adam-jones-wales-axing-
what-7981732	accessed	5/04/2017	
25	Slipping	a	bind	was,	and	is	an	offence,	discussed	earlier	in	the	tribunal.	
26	Tony	Spreadbury	was	a	referee	who	was	attending	the	training	session	at	the	time	to	provide	his	expert	
input	to	assist	with	scrum	practice.	He	was	also	a	paramedic	and	his	actions	saved	Matt	Hampson’s	life.		
27	The	barrister	is	quoting	previous	evidence	by	Richard	Cockerill,	a	coach	and	former	hooker.	
28 In	January	1998,	Richard	Vowles,	29,	was	injured	in	a	local	derby	game.	Consequently,	he	is	now	wheelchair-
bound.	Mr	Vowles	took	the	referee	to	court	for	breach	of	his	duty	to	take	reasonable	care	for	the	safety	of	
front-row	players.	http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1416031/Paralysed-rugby-player-wins-high-court-
case.html	accessed	21/07/2017 
	
	
